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<a>Introduction and aims 
Definitions of public sector corruption abound but, at its most general, corruption is 
considered to be the abuse of government resource or power for private gain, an illegal 
exchange (Varese, 2018). Critical to this definition is the view that corruption is itself a by-
product of high levels of government activity and regulations (Holcombe and Boudreaux, 
2015). At the most abstract level, any form of government intervention creates opportunities 
for corruption, even if we assume that the government intervenes to correct market failures 
(Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000) and not to further the career of bureaucrats and politicians 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). This is because, in order to correct market failures, the 
government needs bureaucracies to make decisions. This generates opportunities for public 
managers to demand bribes or be corrupted (Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000). In economic 
models with some heterogeneity among bureaucrats, this principal–agent problem originates 
a misallocation of resources and increases the size of the bureaucracy. 
Yet, this does not mean that the larger the size of the state, the higher corruption 
levels are – although some econometric estimates suggest greater government intervention 
implies higher levels of corruption (Goel et al., 2010). For example, in Acemoglu and 
Verdier’s model the causal force behind corruption is not the government. Markets do not 
perform efficiently all the time, and governments rightly intervene. But, corruption ‘emerges 
as an unpleasant side effect of necessary intervention’ (Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000: 196). 
Thus, corruption is an empirical manifestation of the trade-off between market failure and 
government failure. It is also wrong to assume that bribes internalize the costs that 
regulations impose on economic agents, an argument aired by political scientist Samuel 
Huntington in 1968 (see also Dreher and Gassebner, 2013; Leff, 1964), because, as the then 
IMF (International Monetary Fund) economist Vito Tanzi (1988) explained, if rules are used 
to extract bribes, more rules will emerge, and this will not be good for growth. 
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Rather, the literature suggests that the type of overall approach to markets and the 
economy matters – and specifically that corruption is more closely associated with the degree 
of state regulation of private business activity as opposed to the level of public spending 
(Hopkin and Rodriguez-Pose, 2007). Regulations and anti-corruption measures – the classic 
responses of governments and international agencies – aim to ‘reduce the opportunity 
structures for corruption and to punish deviant and unlawful [behaviour] through the 
implementation of an integrated set of measures’ (de Sousa, 2010: 8). Yet, these measures 
often backfire. The presence of regulation – especially poorly designed or burdensome rules 
– results in activities aimed at reducing compliance and administrative costs or, better still, 
generating rents (McChesney, 1987; Stigler, 1971). The causal story goes thus: control the 
size of the regulatory state and we limit corruption. 
In one of the first cross-country studies of corruption (this American Economic 
Review paper is still authoritative), Ades and di Tella (1999: 992) find that ‘corruption is 
higher in countries where domestic firms are sheltered from foreign competition by natural or 
policy induced barriers to trade, with economics dominated by a few number of firms, or 
where antitrust regulations are not effective in preventing anticompetitive practices’. A 
simple illustration of the causal story comes from the cross-country econometric evidence of 
correlation between number of days to start a business and the frequency of bribes (Rose-
Ackerman and Palifka, 2016: 68, using Schwab’s data from the Global Competitiveness 
Report 2013–14). Although correlation is not causation, this relationship is often interpreted 
to show that ‘red tape encourages bribery and the expectation of bribes encourages red tape’ 
(Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016: 69). Moving from empirics to theoretical explanations, 
Guriev (2004) has demonstrated that the equilibrium level of red tape is above the social 
optimum. 
Regulation in this chapter is understood to cover public rules that impose a certain 
behaviour on citizens or firms. These rules are issued by the state, regional authorities, 
agencies, and public bodies in general. They take the form of primary or secondary 
legislation, as well as guidelines that impose requirements not originally contemplated by 
legislation. Given this broad definition of regulation, the latter meets corruption in four 
classic situations, sometimes intertwined (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016: 53): (a) 
regulation-imposed compliance and administrative costs that an actor does not want or cannot 
pay. In this case, a bribe is paid to a public officer to lower the cost of regulation; (b) a citizen 
or firm wants to engage with an activity that is considered illegal by regulation and punished 
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with sanctions. This can be the main activity of the agent or a secondary activity, for example 
the illegal disposal of toxic waste is not the main activity of the firm producing waste. In this 
situation corruption enables illegal activity to carry on unsanctioned; (c) the bureaucracy has 
discretion in allocating a benefit that is valuable to individuals using criteria other than 
willingness to pay – for example, when public managers determine if someone is eligible for 
a benefit like subsidized price of fuel; and (d) officials deliver regulation in a situation where 
they can shirk because either they are only minimally monitored or they have low pay scales 
(often both). In these cases, corruption is a system of incentive bonuses for the officials to do 
their job. Apart from this day-to-day low-level corruption, there is an opportunity for grand-
scale regulation-driven corruption in procurement, privatization and the award of important 
concessions – think of the licence to broadcast nationwide or the construction of a subway in 
a capital city (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016: ch. 3). 
Another assumption we make is that most people do not act corruptly on moral 
grounds, but rather because of habit, necessity and opportunities (costs and benefits). Hence 
we see both public managers and individual agents (firms and citizens) as corruptible rather 
than inherently corrupt (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016: 52, citing Miller’s 2006 survey of 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and the Ukraine). Accordingly, we are interested in 
how regulation (the alleged source of corruption) and policy instruments (the cure for the 
disease) trigger or hinder the mechanisms of corruptibility rather than investigating the moral 
grounds that certainly exist but apply only to a minority of actors. In short, there are several 
studies on corruption and regulation. This literature is dominated by the rent-seeking, 
principal–agent inspired definitions of corruption. When we turn to public administration and 
political science, what goes on inside the public administration is the core to the causal link 
between regulation and corruption. 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, we set the scene with a broad account of 
how regulation and corruption as a topic is treated in the social science literature, pointing out 
the dominance of economics. We then drill down on public administration and political 
science, highlighting three key lessons generated there. The central message of the literature 
is that we know regulation and corruption are linked. However, it is incredibly hard to model 
theoretically and unpick empirically the causal relationship. This makes policy design to 
mitigate the effects of regulation similarly difficult. This takes us to our final substantive 
section where we enter a new approach to the analysis of the regulation–corruption 
interrelationship. 
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<a>Who does what in the field? 
We want to know what public administration scholars say about regulation and corruption. 
To get at this contribution, we first need to get a sense of what this research field looks like. 
Let us then start with a wide review of the literature before zooming in on public 
administration. A bibliographic search of ‘corruption AND regulation’ produces one headline 
finding: studies exploring the links between these are dominated by economics.1 Of the 891 
results, 254 are classified in the economics category, as compared to 91 and 50 for political 
science and public administration respectively (see Table 7.1 for a breakdown). Collapsing 
these two fields results in 125 outputs, 92 of which have been published since 2008. This 
domination in terms of quantity feeds through to citations as well: 8 articles in economics 
have over 100 cites and 23 have over 50. In political science we find one article with over 
100 cites – see Treisman’s (2007) review of the cross-national empirical evidence on the 
causes of corruption – and eight reach 50 cites. The picture is worse still in public 
administration. When we isolate the 50 outputs here, we find the top article has 23 cites 
(Hopkin and Rodriguez-Pose, 2007). 
 
<PLEASE INSERT TABLE 7.1 ABOUT HERE; remove internal horizontal rules except the 
2nd; remove the vertical rules; align the numbers vertically along the units> 
 
Table 7.1<em>ISI search results, ‘regulation AND corruption’, May 2018 
 
Field Number of articles 
Economics 254 
Business 94 
Political Science 91 
Law 86 
Management 67 
Criminology Penology 54 
Public Administration 50 
Business Finance 49 
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Environmental Studies 46 
Planning Development 46 
Social Sciences 
Interdisciplinary 
45 
 
 
What does all this mean substantively? Because the field is dominated by economics, we find 
a strong representation of articles based on either formal models that tend to conclude that 
regulation is a cause of corruption or empirical large-n studies. Thinking about the latter, 
because these large-n studies necessarily need large datasets, if you are a reader willing to 
explore this field, you are bound to get immediately into a lot of economics and a lot of 
papers using the same data. Specifically, there is a concentration on indicators like those of 
Transparency International (TI) and the World Bank – in particular its Business and 
Environment Enterprise Survey (BEES) and World Business Environment Survey (WBES) – 
which are not random and concern only the perceptions of corruption. In these studies, there 
is a fairly even split on whether regulation is a cause or effect of corruption. 
To untangle causation, and uncover what might be going on in the black box that lies 
between regulation and corruption, we need to know much more about what is actually 
happening inside government. In short, we need public administration scholarship. Yet, in the 
highly cited studies of economics, you must get to a certain level of sophistication before you 
encounter the workings of public administration. Moreover, if your question is design-
oriented, asking what kind of policy instrumentation works better against corruption, you 
need to scratch beneath the surface . . . a lot! But, we are getting ahead of ourselves. Next, we 
explore what political science and public administration studies tell us about the causal 
effects of regulation on corruption.2 We present three main claims: more regulation leads to 
more corruption; bad regulation leads to more corruption; and, anti-corruption programmes 
lead to more corruption. 
 
<a>Public administration research 
<b>More regulation leads to more corruption 
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The defining argument of the literature is that regulation, and associated tools of new public 
management such as privatization and commercial procurement of public services, offer 
government and business elites opportunities for corruption. While the definition of 
corruption in the social sciences is fairly clear, corruption exists at different levels and takes 
different forms. There is low-level corruption: where regulation can make a public benefit 
scarce or hard to get even if on paper not scarce. Public managers have discretion if their 
bosses cannot check whether or not unqualified applicants get the benefit. Another case is 
when public managers can impose costs instead of distribution benefits, here inspectors may 
or may not report a breach of regulations. Alternatively, we can speak of grand corruption 
when the whole public sector, or significant parts of it, is organized as a rent-extraction 
machine, for example economic activities connected to public transportation (building 
motorways, bridges, major works in the construction industry) or private interests are able to 
shape the institutional rules through private payments to officials and, in doing so, ‘seize’ or 
‘capture’ the state (Hellman et al., 2000; Stigler, 1971). Large projects and large transfers of 
assets may contain regulations that encourage this rent-extraction process, for example by 
making corrupt behaviour difficult to detect. 
Key authors in this regard are Lambsdorff (2002, 2006) and Treisman (2000, 2007: 
212–13), whose reviews and analysis link costly or ‘intrusive’ regulation and corruption 
(both according to subjective and experience indexes of corruption). Lambsdorff (2002, 
2006) outlines a sophisticated way of thinking about how regulation interacts with corruption, 
reminding us that causation is more circular than uni-directional. Rather than treating 
regulation as our starting point, we should look at the role of corruption in the rise of rules. 
Regulation may be motivated by corrupt officials who deliberately create monopolies and 
labyrinthine regulations so complex that bribery is the only way to short-circuit the system. 
After initial success, the corrupt official may then add in administrative delays as part of 
increased rent-seeking: ‘. . . bureaucratic personnel may deliberately slow down service after 
the initial payoff and create more red tape in order to establish additional inducements for 
others to make payments or to raise the ante’ (Rose-Ackerman, 1978: 90 citing Gardiner and 
Olson, 1974: 196; for a similar argument also see Tullock, 1989). The literature is replete 
with famous case studies that unpack not only the corruption opportunities of regulation but 
the corrupt intentions behind regulations (Coolidge and Rose-Ackerman, 1997; De Soto, 
1989; McChesney, 1997). 
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This is complicated further by the effect of distrust in societies (often with high 
corruption). Here, we rehearse an important argument: if people do not trust, they demand 
more regulation and more sanctions or coercive instruments to pull free-riders into line 
(Aghion et al., 2010; Harring, 2016; Pinotti, 2008). The paradox is that in low-trust countries 
individuals demand more government regulation even if they know their government is 
corrupt! Trust originates in decisions about civic-ness made in families. 
Empirically, these arguments that regulation as an iatrogenic intervention – a cure that 
exacerbates the disease – are not without problems, of course. Lambsdorff (2006) notes that 
regulation levels explains only part of the variability across countries. A recurring theme in 
some of this literature is that as soon as we add other variables, the causal linkage between 
state intervention and corruption breaks down. Moreover, we might question some of the data 
operationalization in this regard. For example, Treisman (2000) uses the Institute for 
Management Development (IMD) index subjective assessment of intervention. 
Moving towards solutions, is de-regulation an effective option? Fazekas (2017) notes 
that we lack systematic evidence on whether deregulation really hinders corruption. To 
explore this, he turns to types of regulations and how they may have an impact on different 
types of corruption. Like other studies, this article differentiates between types of corruption: 
petty corruption and high-level corruption. The data show a heterogeneous impact of 
deregulation on the two types of corruption. Contrary to conventional wisdom (see Djankov 
et al., 2002), for Fazekas deregulation of business starts-up can facilitate corruption – this is 
because it facilitates the process of rent-extraction by ruling elites. However, if deregulation 
constrains elites, like in the case of ease of contract enforcement, this can effectively reduce 
government favouritism. Although this critique of the conventional claim made by 
international organizations (that is, easing business start-ups is generally a good way to 
reduce corruption) is conditional on the data used (more on data below), what is relevant for 
our discussion is the set of policy implications. Indeed, the policy implications of this type of 
analysis point towards targeted and context-sensitive approaches. These are two important 
keywords that current and future research carried out by public administration scholars 
should embrace totally: targeted policy instruments and context-sensitive design. We will 
build on these later in the chapter. 
To go back to our analysis of the literature, much also depends on the level of 
bureaucratic discretion. In Rose-Ackerman’s (1986) ground-breaking analysis, unconstrained 
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bureaucracy with wide-ranging discretion produces ‘laziness, inaccuracy, and corruption’ 
(1986: 132; see also Dery, 2002; Emrich-Bakenova, 2009). Here, we see the classic 
principal–agent logic at work: granting officials and agencies too much independence creates 
opportunities for, at best, shirking and, at worst, corruption (often in the forms of 
preferentialism or bribery) (Beazer, 2012; Duvanova, 2012). Duvanova (2017) provides an 
instructive example from Kazakhstan where she compares the building codes of two 
provinces. The code in Kostanai is over 11 000 words in length and provides unambiguous 
technical specifications that must be met. In contrast, Kyzylorda’s code is half the length and 
details no precise standards or enforcement instruments. Thus, the potential for discretion is 
fundamentally shaped by the presence or absence of regulatory standards, benchmarks, 
monitoring mechanisms and targets. They determine officials’ ability to offer their own 
interpretations. Such discretion is often especially high when countries and their economies 
are in transition (for example, see Liou (2017) for a similar argument in relation to China 
during years of economic reform when monitoring of local officials was lax and Innes (2016) 
on EU accession countries in the 1990s). 
Linked to this, the locus of regulation – that is, level of government – appears to 
mediate the incidence of corruption. Does corruption increase if we bring the responsibility 
for regulation down to the level of regions and subnational authorities? Shall we delegate 
regulation to independent authorities in order to mitigate corruption? So far, the consensus is 
that shifting power downward is not ‘a generally feasible solution’ (Rose-Ackerman, 2006: 
38; Woodruff, 2006) given the contested nature of the empirical evidence. 
The conditioning influence of perceptions is another key theme in public 
administration and political science. The field is marked by clear disagreements about the 
efficacy of top-down versus bottom-up approaches. One of the most prevalent criticisms is 
that even when institutional reforms have been made, people still may not perceive that there 
is a level and fair playing field (Brock, 2018) or decreases in levels of perception may only 
be slight (see, for example, Iniguez (2017) on Ecuador). For example, Di Tella and 
MacCulloch (2006) in their analysis of Latin America, unlike many others, do not look at the 
day-to-day experience of corruption. Instead they focus on perceptions, no matter what the 
experience may be. One curious finding is that while business managers often say that 
corruption is a way to get around inefficient regulations and barriers to market operations, for 
citizens corruption is a way to avoid compliance with legitimate laws or regulations and to 
impose more costs on the public. In short, citizens refuse to believe regulations are rent-
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seeking devices. Because this attitude lowers the public perception of business and private 
economic activities, it also diffuses among those who believe that corruption is everywhere 
and the tendency to find socialism attractive. 
 
<b>Bad regulation produces more corruption 
The second major claim of the public administration-facing literature is that it is not the level 
of regulation that is the problem, but rather the fact that some type of regulation is 
particularly ‘bad’. At a basic level, regulations may be misunderstood or unknown to officials 
(Kurniawan et al., 2017 on Indonesia). In their analysis of 26 African countries, Lambsdorff 
and Cornelius (2000) find corruption is positively correlated with the degree to which the 
regulations are vague. This should make us think about the way in which regulations are 
delivered, otherwise how do we know that a regulation is vague or not? In such cases, we 
have a problem of analytical or communicative capacity gaps. Most obviously, turning to 
possible solutions, inspectors and street-level bureaucrats play a crucial role in identifying 
and mitigating this lack of clarity. 
Alternatively, regulatory structures may simply be out of date (see Lambsdorff, 2002: 
116) or unfit for purpose. In a recent article, Ramio (2017) suggests public institutions in 
Spain can be made less permeable to corruption with the design of a new regulatory 
framework for public service provision tailored to the ‘network management of public 
services’ (2017: 1) that sees services procured from and provided by a multiplicity of public, 
private and third sector actors (for a similar argument on public appointments in Spain see 
Cerrillo-i-Martinez, 2017). 
Djankov et al. (2002) help finesse the argument that some types of red tape are more 
detrimental than others. Specifically, the estimated costs of starting a business and number of 
regulatory procedures are found to correlate strongly with perceived levels of corruption (on 
the TI index, but recall what we said about Fazekas above). Finally, the causal relationship 
depends on the independence of prosecutors. In this field, it is common to distinguish 
between de facto and de jure independence. Van Aaken et al. (2010) show that, in their 
sample of 78 countries, de facto independence decreases corruption, but formal independence 
has little impact. 
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<b>Anti-corruption measures create more corruption through regulations 
Since the 1980s and 1990s, we have witnessed the global growth of anti-corruption agencies 
(ACAs) – for example, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), the 
International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (IAACA) – and instruments. The 
failure of many ACAs has been well-documented (Batory, 2012; de Sousa, 2010; Prasser, 
2012). Capacity problems, and the likelihood that weakness will be deliberately built in to an 
agency’s design, stack the decks against success. 
Anti-corruption measures can also involve layering on more regulations. The EU has 
been especially particularly proactive in this regard. The first major move in 1995 was to 
launch its protocol to address the embezzlement of EU funds. The Convention of the 
Protection of Material Interests of the European Communities (EU Convention) includes 
coordinated penalties and definitions prescribed for corruption and financial fraud. In 2003, 
efforts were extended by the Council of Europe to combat corruption in private and non-
profit sectors,3 and in 2008 the Council created a network to boost cooperation between 
member states combating corruption in public procurement.4 In 2011, the Commission 
stepped up its efforts further still with proposals on the harmonization of prevention laws, and 
since 2013 has reported every two years on each member state’s corruption profile. 
Yet, these efforts are often ineffective. Regulatory complexity created by the layering 
of anti-corruption measures, and the impact of economic forces in procurement, imply the 
possibility of relapsing back to pre-anti-corruption measure days (see Ayhan and Ustuner, 
2015 for a recent example from Turkey). In such instances, the pull of long-established 
informal rules and codes embedded in everyday life is especially strong (on China see Gong 
and Zhou, 2014; on Central and Eastern European countries see Wallace and Latcheva, 
2006). 
Bratu’s (2018) study of Romania offers an original analysis of how anti-corruption 
programmes are spawned. Her analysis is sociological but her argument speaks eloquently to 
public administration scholars and policy analysts. Anxieties about corruption in Romania 
have transformed EU development and cohesion policy into a problem of fighting corruption 
and protecting the monies of the EU. So, we have a complete recategorization of a policy – 
from development policy to anti-corruption. But, the story goes on, anti-corruption comes 
with its own heavy regulatory framework (as we have seen above). This regulation layering 
raises the cost of applying for EU funding – small firms are excluded and only the best-
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organized firms can access EU funding for projects. Other firms hire specialist consultants 
that translate the language of EU formalities and regulations into the language that economic 
operators understand. Eligibility evolves into a production factor (to use Bratu’s metaphor 
(2018))! The whole system becomes heavily regulated and makes non-compliance harder to 
detect because the bar is raised: more specialism and more ‘entrepreneurs’ allow local actors 
to fund their activities even if these activities do not really produce development and 
cohesion. Not only does the cost of corruption on a day-to-day basis rise, but more 
worryingly the whole policy is in the end ‘corrupted’ in the sense that under these conditions 
public policy does no longer reach its objectives. 
 
<a>Designing meta-regulation 
Where do these three claims, and the sobering lessons provided by contrasting empirical 
analyses, really take us? If we think in terms of policy design, we still lack any robust, widely 
shared causal theory of the relationship between regulation and corruption. Distinguishing 
between good and bad regulations and anti-corruption measures cannot be effected without 
any clarity about what is driving corruption in the first place (see Rose-Ackerman, 2006: 6 on 
this circularity). To get beyond this impasse, we must look beyond the total numbers of 
regulations or the pages in given code. An original way to recast the debate, although it may 
not provide the final answer on the claims about causality, is to raise the question: where does 
regulation come from? It certainly comes from a process through which regulations are 
appraised, designed, enter into force, are delivered and recalibrated through judicial review. 
This is where public administration scholars encounter the vast territory of administrative law 
– and more specifically the subset concerned with rule-making. Within administrative law, 
there is a whole set of rules that discipline the life cycle of regulation. These are rules about 
rules, or meta-regulation (see Radaelli, 2007 for various definitions). 
Thus, when we look back at the claims about too much regulation or regulatory 
quality, this approach points us towards the instrumentation of meta-regulation. Rule-making 
is regulated by different administrative procedures. These procedures are incarnated in policy 
instruments. We are moving the causal chain one step deeper by arguing that regulatory 
quantity and quality depend on the design of policy instruments of meta-regulation. It follows 
that the cross-country variation in the causal effects of regulation and corruption depends on 
how these policy instruments work. Do they trigger social mechanisms that effectively make 
12 
 
 
the bureaucracy accountable to the general public or special interests that should be 
enfranchised in rule-making? Or, do they push the bureaucracy towards capture by a single 
interest? Whose preferences does public administration internalize when rules are designed, 
appraised and delivered? Following Terry Moe (1984), the instruments that design rule-
making bring in good regulation by changing the structure of rule-making itself – to repeat 
one more time, through the adoption of instruments we regulate rule-making. 
What are these meta-regulatory policy instruments, then? The list, arguably, is not 
exhaustive, but it includes consultation (or, in the vocabulary of the North-American 
literature, notice and comment); substantive judicial review; freedom of information Acts 
(FOIA); ombudsman; regulatory impact assessment (RIA); plus more general high-level 
transparency principles contained in administrative law.5 These instruments trigger one of the 
following instruments, or combine them: 
 
1. <nl>1. Impose obligations on regulators even in the absence of pressure from 
principals or stakeholders, or 
2. 2. Enfranchise interests and make sure that special values are not violated: for 
example, economic analysis is protected by RIA, the rule of law is sheltered by 
judicial review. These ways the protected interests can pull fire alarms when their 
preferences are at risk of being violated (Damonte et al., 2014), or 
3. 3. Increase the overall level and quality of information and transparency available in 
the system.</list> 
Our causal narrative rests on the following propositions. First, the instruments work 
together, hence we should model the causal effect of the whole policy instrument mix on 
corruption as outcome. It is the overall design that has causal effects (Damonte et al., 2014). 
Second, this causal effect works through mechanisms that make the bureaucracy accountable 
to a narrow or wide set of actors . Third, it is the accountability relationship at the stage of 
rule-making that has a special place in the production of corruption. In fact, it is when a rule 
is formulated or delivered that bribes are paid and corrupt exchanges take place. By working 
together, the instrumentation of meta-regulation can either make a special interest in control 
of rule-making (this can also be the public managers themselves) or make the bureaucracy 
respond to a plurality of interests. We can see now that the issue is no longer one of 
constraining bureaucracy or giving it discretion. Neither is it an issue of the political 
principals being able to force on the bureaucracy their preferences. It is an issue of whether 
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by design rule-making generates accountability to a pluralist constellation of interests that 
have a special place in a political system (the citizens, the rule of law, science, but also the 
elected politicians and the economic actors affected by regulation). If this is correct, we 
would expect cross-national variation on this crucial issue or dimension (for preliminary 
evidence see Damonte et al., 2014). The effects on the outcome of corruption should be 
determined by this variation. This brings us to our final questions: to examine this variation, 
how shall we model causality? And, what type of data are available? 
 
<a>Measures and design 
The design of causality (or, in our case, what we have in mind when we think about 
regulation explaining corruption) and empirical observations (data, measures, and so on) are 
the two big elephants in the room when it comes to measuring the relationship between 
regulation and corruption. For example, if we argue that meta-regulatory policy instruments 
hinder corruption, we immediately face an issue of explanation. How do we model causality 
in our research design? If the argument is that the effects on corruption are generated by a 
constellation of regulatory policy instruments (a policy mix, as we said), then we have to 
model causality accordingly. It is reasonable to theorize that what matters is not the single 
effect of an instrument (for example, a bivariate correlation between consultation and 
corruption, and more generally co-variational research designs), but the combined effect of 
the whole rule-making instrumentation. 
We argued above that the policy mix imposes obligations on the regulators (and 
public bodies more generally) as well as supporting specific rights (to access, to information, 
to notification, and so on) of citizens and, in some cases, the regulated entities (be it a 
company or someone who wants to open a new shop). The accountability mechanism 
triggered by obligations and rights should limit the possibility of corrupt exchanges and keep 
the bureaucracy out of any significant capture. This depends on how the instruments interact 
or, in other words, on the efficiency of the policy design. The most reasonable solution is to 
model causal explanation as configurational. There is logically a finite number of 
configurations of conditions (FOIA, RIA, consultation, and so on) that is associated with the 
outcome corruption. Empirically, we observe only a subset of these logically possible 
configurations across countries or regions that represent our population. Within this subset, 
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we find how the difference in outcomes is explained by conditions (Ragin, 1997; Schneider 
and Wagemann, 2012). 
Because this research design is rooted in an understanding of causality that comes 
from the theory of sets, rather than the central limit theory in statistics, there is no issue of 
statistical threshold that the explanation must meet not to be rejected. An original 
combination of instruments may be effective in controlling corruption even in just one 
country. It will not be neglected as it would have been in a statistical model. It may be a 
unique case where context (one of the two keywords we talked about above) has particular 
effects on the mechanisms of corruption. It can be a case from which we can still extrapolate 
useful lessons for targeted approaches – as opposed to one-size-fits-all ‘best practice’. 
Further, the research design allows for equifinality – meaning that the same 
mechanism can be triggered by different pathways or combinations of individual instruments 
(‘conditions’ in the language of set-theory). For example, accountability to the general public 
can in one country be delivered via the freedom of information regulations, but in other 
countries the same mechanism can be generated by open and systematic consultation of the 
public. 
And yet, what about the problem of confounders? How do we know that a given 
causal relationship between regulation and corruption is not confounded by the presence of a 
third important variable (the electoral system, the level of decentralization, the quality of 
public administration, and so on) that we have not included in our model? If we rely on 
classic econometric techniques, there are technical fixes like instrumental variables but in the 
end what makes the difference is the quality of theory. We can only control for variables we 
have thought about in our theoretical approach to the problem of corruption (Radaelli and 
Wagemann, 2018). If we adopt a set-theoretic research design and embrace multiple 
conjunctural causation there is less knowledge, because in this field the discussion on omitted 
conditions that may affect the outcome is relatively new and has meanings that are not the 
same as classic econometric reasoning (Radaelli and Wagemann, 2018). 
Finally, no matter how well we calibrate our research design to allow for the correct 
inferences to be drawn from empirical observations, we still face the challenge of how to 
measure corruption across countries. We have already mentioned measurement issues in the 
field. A vast literature has raised pretty fundamental doubts on the validity of the most 
common cross-country indicators like TI’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (Heywood and 
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Rose, 2014). Unfortunately, as we have already seen above, this is one of the indicators most 
often used in cross-country research. 
Are we condemned to use datasets we have little confidence in just because they are 
the only ones that allow for cross-country analysis? Others have looked instead for 
alternatives, especially objective measures. By their very nature, objective measures do not 
have the bias of perceptions-based indicators. To illustrate, Golden and Picci (2005) have 
used the gap in physical infrastructure (a given level of infrastructure should exist given the 
level of capital outlay, if it is not there it must be because of corruption). In a recent 
contribution, Escresa and Picci (2017) construct a measure based on the geographical 
distribution of public managers involved in cross-border corruption cases – the Public 
Administration Corruption Index (PACI). 
Another approach to objective measures is to look at single bidding in competitive 
markets as a proxy of favouritism in public procurement (Fazekas, 2017). Building on this 
argument, Fazekas and Kocsis (2017) provide a measure of ‘corruption risk’ based on 1.4 
million public procurement contracts to identify the single bidders in high-cost public 
procurement. This objective measure is used together with subjective measures, precisely the 
European Quality of Government Index (EQI), by Bahur and Charron (2018). The study by 
Bahur and Charron is not on corruption. But, it has the merit of drawing our attention to 
regional measures, thus breaking down with the assumption that corruption is best measured 
at the national level. This seems to us important for future research: it should not be taken for 
granted that cross-country empirical analyses should be carried out at the national level. The 
regional level can provide valuable lessons. 
A radical approach is to switch from corruption to integrity measures. The index of 
public integrity6 covers the dimensions of judicial independence, administrative burdens, 
trade openness, budget transparency, e-citizenship and freedom of the press. The research 
design would then be empirically tested by considering measures of regulation and integrity 
rather than regulation and corruption. However, in this particular index of integrity, 
regulation is on both sides of the equation so to speak, since administrative burdens are a 
component of the regulatory costs. The measure is also too heterogeneous (it includes 
freedom of the press and independence of the judiciary) to be used with validity in studies of 
the causal effects of regulation. 
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Although the debate on measuring corruption is lively, there is no clear convergence. 
To establish the exact meaning of corruption in a given social setting and achieve strong 
construct validity, one has to go in the field and look at how communities socially construct 
corruption. For example, Mancini et al. (2017) have documented the variety of 
representations of corruption in the British, French and Italian press. Bratu and Kažova 
(2018) have exposed metaphors of corruption in seven European countries tracing the news 
media for ten years. One can even go deeper than the media, and draw on political 
ethnography and practice tracing to find when and how a community defines a certain 
behaviour as corrupt or acceptable (Blundo and De Sardan, 2006; Bratu, 2017). 
Methodologically, this type of research will benefit from practice tracing (Pouliot, 2014). 
However, practice and meaning-tracing has obvious limits when one is interested in 
cross-national research. Then one needs data that are available in time-series and for many 
countries. For us, the most coherent response is to generate new data that respond both to the 
research questions about corruption and regulation we want to address, and second, reflect 
faithfully the understanding of causality (statistical or set-theoretical, for example) embodied 
in the research design. 
 
<a>Conclusions 
Public administration is a lens to critically observe three claims made about regulation and 
corruption. One is that too much regulation produces corruption. Another is that it is the 
quality of regulation or certain types of regulation (such as administrative burdens triggered 
by regulations) which creates opportunities for corruption. The third is that in the attempt to 
curb corruption, new regulatory measures may exacerbate the problem rather than curing it. 
The field is still dominated by economics and by a small number of cross-country indicators 
of corruption, hence the role of public administration up until now has been to bring context 
and targeted approaches to bear on the three causal claims. Not necessarily should we focus 
on the national context, regional analyses can be instructive too. 
To make further progress, we have argued that public administration should pay more 
attention to the policy instruments that discipline rule-making. This requires innovations in 
how we conceptualize these policy instruments or rule-making procedures. We have made 
the case for considering the whole policy mix or constellation as the correct unit of analysis 
to explore causal effects on outcomes on corruption. This also requires a critical 
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reconsideration of how we model causality, and to the mechanisms through which we 
theorize an effect on corruption. Finally, the state of play concerning the available measures 
of corruption is not encouraging. We need to break the chain between measures that are 
increasingly questioned and the fact that we use these very measures because they are the 
only ones available for cross-country research. This can be done by going back to studies of 
the local context tracing the meanings and the practices where corruption emerges socially, or 
by designing our own data so that they reflect more accurately our research design and 
questions. 
 
<a>Notes 
<Please take in notes * and 1–6 here> 
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